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Abstract 
 
The United States is experiencing a sweeping neoliberal education reform agenda.  
The marketization of education is the latest trend in this neoliberal education agenda, and 
it finally took in hold in Kentucky.  Charter schools are understood as being part of the 
marketization of education, which comes with lower accountability standards and a 
siphoning of public funds away from traditional public schools. Kentucky has a history of 
education reform policies that have resulted in an improvement in the quality of public 
education.  However, public education has seen a decline in the allocation of state resources 
over the past decade.  This steady decline in funding has led to more public schools being 
labeled as failing.  Thus charter school legislation emerged in Kentucky and succeeded in 
passing into law.  Save Our Schools Kentucky (SOSKY) mobilized in opposition to 
Kentucky’s charter school legislation.  I worked with and studied SOSKY’s ‘Stop Charters in 
KY’ advocacy campaign, and I found that SOSKY was successful in building a strong 
constituency base and building rapport within the legislature but failed to block the 
passage of charter school legislation due to the timing of the mobilization, the political 
timing, and the timing of the legislative action on the bill.  My analysis shows that because 
SOSKY mobilized too late in order to set up adequate fundraising strategies, the 
conservatives finally had control of all bodies in the state legislature, and the bill was 
pushed through at the end of the session giving Kentuckians very little time to become 
familiar with its contents, the Stop Charters in KY campaign failed.  In order to move 
forward, advocates must mobilize to ensure accountability and transparency in charter 
school implementation and work to return power to the local school boards.  
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I. Introduction  
 
House Bill 520 (HB 520) was signed into Kentucky state law on March 21, 2017, 
making it the 44th state to pass charter school legislation in the US (Barton, 2017).  The 
main objective of HB 520 is to permit a no cap limit on charter schools, including for-profit 
charter schools, which are publicly funded but operate outside of the local school district’s 
authority.  This paper is centered on studying Save Our School Kentucky’s (SOSKY) ‘Stop 
Charters in KY’ advocacy campaign, which intended to block the passage of charter school 
legislation in Kentucky in 2017.  Charter schools are critiqued for the lack of improvement 
in student achievement, the negative impact on funding for the public education system, 
the failure to address race and class, and the lack of professional development for teachers.  
SOSKY’s ‘Stop Charters in KY’ advocacy campaign was successful in building a strong 
constituency base and building rapport within the legislature but failed to block the 
passage of charter school legislation due to the timing of the mobilization, the political 
timing, and the timing of the legislative action on the bill.  My analysis shows that because 
SOSKY mobilized too late in order to set up adequate fundraising strategies, the 
conservatives finally had control of all bodies in the state legislature, and the bill was 
pushed through at the end of the session giving Kentuckians very little time to become 
familiar with its contents, the ‘Stop Charters in KY’ campaign failed. 
Charter schools are publicly funded schools that adhere to far fewer regulations and 
accountability standards than traditional public schools. Charter school advocates claim 
that regulations stand in the way of innovation (Barton, 2017).  Charter schools are 
typically managed by educational management organizations, universities, government 
entities or non-profit organizations.  While not all charter school legislation allows for-
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profit entities to manage charter schools, but this bill does (Harmer, 2017).  After reviewing 
the literature thus far, there are four areas of critique leveled at charter schools: the lack of 
improvement in student achievement, the siphoning of public funds away from public 
schools, the failure to address race and class equity, and the lack of professional 
development for teachers.  The considerable variation in student achievement among 
different charter schools and the similarities between successful traditional public schools 
and charter schools pose the question of whether we can expect consistent and sustainable 
improvements in student achievement in charter schools. Whether charter schools are 
using public funds in order to make a profit or are weakening the financial stability of 
school districts, charter schools are negatively impacting the amount of public funds 
available for public education. Charter schools in general have failed to address race and 
class issues, particularly those of integration and quality of education.  Scholars have 
associated these failures with a lack of intervention to increase diverse student populations 
and teacher representation in accordance with their students. Despite recent interventions 
to enhance professional development among teachers to avoid teacher attrition, charter 
schools and their non-union status ensure a lack of teacher professional development. 
 
 
II. Methodology 
 
In order to conduct this research, I interned for State Representative Kelly Flood’s 
reelection campaign and volunteered for Save Our Schools Kentucky.  Representative Flood 
and I were discussing her legislative priorities after her reelection for the then upcoming 
2017 legislative session.  In this discussion, she informed me that charter school legislation 
was likely to be on the agenda and would be a highly contentious issue.  After I did some 
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brief preliminary research on the issue and Kentucky’s history regarding education, I felt 
compelled to write my Capstone about charter schools in the context of Kentucky through 
the lens of an advocacy campaign case study.  Next I searched online for which advocacy 
organizations were directly involved in campaigning against charter school legislation in 
Kentucky through the use of social media.  I found Save Our Schools Kentucky (SOSKY) on 
Facebook and saw that they had high levels of activity on social media and were already 
hosting lunch and learn events and movie screenings to educate the public about how 
charter school legislation would serve as a threat to the quality and existence of public 
education in Kentucky.  I reached out to the organization through a message on Facebook 
and received a quick and positive response to my request to join in the fight.  Most of our 
discussions took place over the phone or in private messaging on Facebook, as most of the 
advocates were located over an hour away from where I lived.  By the time I got involved, 
most of the strategic decisions had been made and my role was more focused on 
implementation, especially because I lived so close to the Kentucky State Capitol.  I was 
involved in lobbying legislators, helping out with events at the Capitol, and attending 
meetings with other interested groups about how they could get involved with our 
advocacy efforts.  My sources of data are journal articles; news articles; reports; legislation; 
participant observation; and interviews with state officials, advocates, parents, and 
teachers.  I conducted two interviews with state elected officials, one interview with a state 
appointed official, and five interviews with advocates. 
 
My sources of data are journal articles; news articles; reports; legislation; 
participant observation; and interviews with state officials, advocates, parents, and 
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teachers.  I conducted two interviews with state elected officials, one interview with a state 
appointed official, and five interviews with advocates.  The state elected officials I 
interviewed were State Representative Kelly Flood and State Representative Attica Scott.  
The state appointed official I interviewed was State Education Commissioner, Dr. Stephen 
Pruitt.  All of the advocates I interviewed are members of Save Our Schools Kentucky.  I 
conducted these interviews in person or through a phone conversation.  I chose state 
elected official interviewees based on their connection to the legislative process.  
Representative Flood has been the chair of the house education budget committee in the 
past and Representative Scott is a current member of the house education committee.  
Commissioner Pruitt is considered to be an education expert and worked for the Georgia 
Department of Education when charter schools were approved in Georgia.  I chose 
advocate interviewees based on their varied perspectives and on availability, as most of the 
advocates were juggling full time jobs, family obligations, and working on advocacy efforts 
in their remaining free time.   
 
III. Context: Neoliberalism and History of Kentucky’s Education System 
Inform Charter School Adoption 
 
Conservative activists have been promoting neoliberal reforms to the US education 
system for several decades.  The marketization of education is the latest trend in this 
neoliberal education agenda, and it finally took in hold in Kentucky in the form of a new law 
authorizing charter schools (Bunka, 2011; Davis, 2013).  Charter schools come with lower 
levels of public accountability, and they siphon public funds away from traditional public 
schools (Harmer, 2017; Davis, 2013). Charter school supporters highlight their ability to 
innovate with the removal of regulation, a hallmark of neoliberalism (Davis, 2013; Levy, 
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2010).  Kentucky has a history of education reform policies that have resulted in an 
improvement in the quality of public education (Ellis, 2011; Ladd, 1999).  However, public 
education has seen a decline in the allocation of state resources over the past decade 
(Pruitt, 2016).  This steady decline in funding hurt public education; allowing conservative 
activists to claim public schools are ineffective (Ed Reform Playbook, 2017).  Thus charter 
school advocates succeeded in passing a law to allow the first charter schools in the state. 
In order to understand the adoption of charter school legislation in Kentucky, I will 
first discuss the emergence of charter schools in the US in relation to the framing strategy 
of charter school supporters.  Charter school supporters have framed charter schools as a 
solution to the limitations of public schools by using neoliberal ideology and the promotion 
of particular federal policies.  Then I will briefly examine the positive and negative 
implications of charter schools in the US.  Finally, I will discuss how Kentucky’s history of 
education reform informed the rationale of the emergence of charter school legislation in 
Kentucky in 2017. 
A. The Emergence of Charter Schools in the US 
 
 
1. The Neoliberal Marketization of Education 
 
Charter schools emerged in the US as part of the neoliberal education agenda, which 
has manifested itself into the marketization of education (Bunka, 2011; Blakely, 2017).  By 
marketization of education I mean, the application of market forces onto the public 
education system.  The neoliberal doctrine refers to restricting state intervention, 
increasing private involvement, and relying on market efficiency (Bunka, 2011; Blakely 
2017). There are only six remaining states that have yet to adopt charter school legislation.  
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Why did the marketization of education gain popularity among particular decision makers 
and parents?   
Charter school supporters believe that state intervention in public schools creates 
limitations around innovation, but it is proven to also maintain accountability in student 
achievement, teacher certification, and budget allocations (Bunka, 2011).  Because public 
schools receive federal, state and local funding, the state intervenes at all levels ranging 
from curriculum development to facility regulations (Bunka, 2011; Davis, 2013).  Public 
schools are required to participate in state testing and teacher training programs to ensure 
accountability (Bunka, 2011).  However, this funding also gives public schools the 
opportunity to provide some extra curricular activities and “offer funding opportunities for 
continuing education” (Bunka, 2011). The thinking that limitations in public schools are 
due to public funding and state intervention has fueled the debate centered on charter 
schools serving as a solution to these understood ‘limitations’ of public schools.  
 
2. Policies that Gave Rise to the Adoption of Charter School Legislation 
 
Because the United States Constitution does not deem education as a fundamental 
right for all, charter schools have emerged in this lack of comprehensive of social rights.  
The 10th amendment leaves this issue up to the states and the 14th amendment ensures all 
people have equal protection under the law (Lurie, 2013; The 14th Amendment, 2017).  
Thus if a state establishes a public school system, according to the constitutional 
amendments, all children living in the jurisdiction of the state are granted free public 
education (The 14th Amendment, 2017).  However, the state is not required to set up a 
public school system in the first place (The 14th Amendment, 2017).  This lack of 
comprehensive social rights in the foundational document of United States government 
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permits entities like charter schools to threaten the sustainability and quality of public 
education. Similarly it allows the federal government has the right to incentivize states to 
approve legislation that has the potential of jeopardizing public education.   
Obama’s Race to the Top Fund, created in 2002, was one such federal program to 
incentivize states to adopt charter school legislation.  The US Department of Education had 
$4.35 billion in discretionary spending to fuel the Race to the Top program, especially in 
the form of charter schools (Bunka, 2011; Johnston, 2012).  The Race to the Top Fund 
promoted state education reform and overall better school performance through “a 
competitive federal grant program based on a number of criteria, including the adoption 
and expansion of charter schools” (Bunka, 2011; Johnston, 2012). Within this program, 
decision makers claimed, “that charter systems expand educational opportunities to 
disadvantaged students and can serve as a vehicle to move out of poverty” (Bunka, 2011).  
Due to the competitive nature of Race to the Top Fund grants, the adoption of charter 
school legislation allowed states to receive more federal funding for education.  This has 
made it difficult for charter school opponents to block the passage of their charter adoption 
legislation when it requires the denial of these federal funds. 
 
B. What are the Problems with Charter Schools?  
 
Charter schools exist in many different forms; some are completely publicly funded, 
some have religious affiliations, some are run by for-profit educational management 
organizations hundreds of miles off site. The varied nature of charter schools impacts 
scholars’ and researchers’ ability to conduct comparative studies.  However after reviewing 
the literature thus far, there are four areas of critique leveled at charter schools: the lack of 
improvement in student achievement, the misuse of public funds, the failure to address 
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race and class, and the lack of professional development for teachers.  I will discuss each 
below.  
 
1. Lack of Improvement in Student Achievement 
 
Charter schools claim to offer solutions to the student achievement gap, but so far the 
research has shown otherwise.  With the exception of a few cases that have particular 
characteristics, overall student achievement is either the same as traditional public schools 
or it is negatively impacted by charter schools (Berends, 2015; Maas, 2015; Miron, 2007).  
One of the largest studies of charter schools found that on average there are “no significant 
effects on mathematics and reading achievement” (Gleason, Clark, Tuttle, Dwoyer, & 
Silverberg, 2010).  Furthermore, when significant impacts on student achievement are 
found in particular charter schools, the variation is substantial across different schools 
(Gleason et al., 2010) posing the question regarding impacts associated with charter status 
or other elements.  In another study looking at the impact of charter schools on student 
achievement in: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin, “student 
achievement in [charter schools] is lower than it is in demographically similar public 
schools” (Miron, 2007, p. 1).  Furthermore, Miron’s research indicates, “for some 60 
percent of the school level comparisons drawn, charter schools were performing at levels 
lower than predicted” (2007).  Maas’s research found when comparing charter schools 
with their public school counterparts, the successful schools in each category “look very 
similar” (2015).  Maas suggests it would be more beneficial to bypass the charter versus 
public school impact studies on student achievement and simply look at successful schools 
in both sectors and “explore [their] characteristics and policies that enable the 
implementation and scalability of effective schools” (2015).  The considerable variation in 
#NowAreYouStartingToGetIt?: A Case Study of 'Stop Charters in KY’ Advocacy Campaign 
 
 9 
student achievement among different charter schools and the similarities between 
successful traditional public schools and charter schools pose the question of whether we 
can expect consistent and sustainable improvements in student achievement in charter 
schools. 
Although charter schools are broadly either on par or worse for student achievement, 
there are stories of success, like in New York City and urban areas in Massachusetts.  
Longer school days and years, increased time on core content, like English, and distinct 
disciplinary approaches are characteristics of New York City and urban Massachusetts’s 
charter schools with positive impacts on student achievement (Hoxby, Murarka, & Kang, 
2009; Angrist et al., 2011).  In one study, centered on New York City, researchers found 
extremely significant closures in the “Scarsdale-Harlem achievement gap” (Hoxby, 
Murarka, & Kang, 2009).  For example, “a student who attended a charter school for all of 
grades kindergarten through eight would close about 86 percent of ‘Scarsdale-Harlem 
achievement gap’ in English” (Hoxby, Murarka, & Kang, 2009).  Factors associated with 
New York City charter schools with these significant closures in the achievement gap are: 
“a long school year; a greater number of minutes devoted to English during each school 
day; a small rewards/small penalties disciplinary policy; teacher pay based somewhat on 
performance or duties, as opposed to a traditional pay scale based strictly on seniority and 
credentials; [and] a mission statement that emphasizes academic performance, as opposed 
to other goals” (Hoxby, Murarka, & Kang, 2009, p. viii). Additionally, urban Massachusetts’ 
charter school students are performing better academically than their peers in traditional 
public schools (Angrist et al., 2011).  Similar to researchers in New York City, researchers 
in urban areas of Massachusetts note positive contributions to the effects to be: “longer 
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school days, more instructional time on core content, [and] a ‘no excuses’ philosophy” 
(Angrist et al., 2011).  Conversely, none of the nonurban charter schools in Massachusetts 
adhere to a ‘no excuses’ approach (Angrist et al., 2011).  Student achievement in charter 
schools across the US is on average the same or worse than traditional public schools 
(Berends, 2015; Maas, 2015; Miron, 2007).  This poses the question of whether charter 
schools can uphold sustainable and consistent positive results in student achievement.  
However, successful closures in the student achievement gap are prominent in areas like 
New York City and urban Massachusetts.  Researchers associate longer school days and 
years, increased time on core content, like English, and distinct disciplinary approaches 
with these more successful urban charter schools.   
 
2. Siphoning of Public Funds Away from Public Schools 
 
Whether charter schools are using public funds in order to make a profit or are 
weakening the financial stability of school districts, charter schools are negatively 
impacting the use of public funds intended for public education.  Charter school proponents 
have found a way to receive public funds and entitle themselves as public charters, but then 
some of these institutions operate as for-profit enterprises (Bankston, 2013).  Eighty 
percent of charter schools in Michigan operate as for-profit schools (Bankston, 2013).  This 
shift of public funds to private interests is mechanized by private educational management 
organizations (EMOs) functioning under contract to run charter schools (Bankston, 2013).  
These for-profit EMOs are more likely to “offer a more limited range of services […] [and] 
less likely to serve high school students and students with special education needs since 
these students are more expensive to educate” (Roch, 2015, p. 1382).  One critique leveled 
at this limited offering of services poses the question of public access for all in these so-
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called public charter schools, as public schools are required to serve all children in its 
district (The 14th Amendment, 2017).  Critics of for-profit EMOs running charter schools 
argue, “outsourcing to EMOs results in already limited school resources being redirected 
for service fees, profits or both” (Miron, Urschel, Yat Aguilar, & Dailey, 2011).  Additionally 
critics express concerns regarding, “transparency and the implications of public bodies 
relinquishing control or ownership of schools” (Miron, Urschel, Yat Aguilar, & Dailey, 
2011).  The transference of public funds to for-profit EMOs results in a lack of transparency 
and public access, particularly access for children that tend to require more resources to 
educate.  This lack of transparency and access constitutes the critique that for-profit 
charter schools are taking tax dollars away from public education. 
Not only do for-profit charter schools siphon public funds away from public schools, 
they also weaken the financial stability of public school districts.  A study of the impacts of 
charter expansion on a district in Nashville, Tennessee found that charters: “cause the 
transfer of state and local per student funds without reducing operation costs, […] increase 
direct and indirect costs, […] and negatively impact deferred maintenance at leased 
buildings” (Baker, 2016, p. 10).  Increased charter school enrollment is found to be 
associated with declining revenues in host districts with non-proportionate decline in 
costs.  When more students attend charter schools and the district is left to serve less than 
2,000 students or falls below the “efficient-scale threshold,” the “costs of providing 
comparable services rise” (Baker, 2016, p. 12).  Furthermore, charter schools typically 
serve fewer students with special needs, leaving public school districts with more students 
with special needs, which require substantially more resources (Baker, 2016).   
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3. Failure to Address Race and Class 
 
One of the benefits charter school supporters have promised is the desegregation of 
schools and greater quality for under-served students in the public school system, who are 
disproportionately students of color.  However according to the Civil Rights Project, 
“seventy percent of Black charter school students attend immensely segregated minority 
charter schools…or twice as many as the share of intensely segregated Black students in 
traditional public schools,” (Bankston, 2013).  Scholars suggest one factor associated with 
segregated charter schools are the lack of regulations or programs to promote diverse 
student populations (Scott & Villavicencio, 2009).  Scott and Villavicencio found that “being 
a charter alone is an insufficient mechanism for closing the racial achievement gap,” as 
“racially segregated, well-resourced and high-performing [charter] schools tend to be the 
exception rather than the rule” (Scott & Villavicencio, 2009, p. 238).  Furthermore, many 
charters are characterized by having “white teachers and administrators over-see[ing] 
black and Latino students” (Bankston, 2013, p. 25).  Some researchers have found that 
when teachers come from the same racialized group as their students, student achievement 
can benefit, not to mention the benefits from these teachers serving as “role models, 
mentors, advocates or cultural translators” (Egalite, Kisida, & Winters, 2015, p. 3).  Charter 
schools are failing to desegregate schools; in fact some scholars have found that they 
increase segregation.  Moreover charter schools do not provide better quality education for 
under-served students, who are disproportionately students of color. 
 
Additionally charter schools tend to be economically segregated.  Even though charter 
schools are more likely to be located in low socioeconomic status neighborhoods, this does 
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not increase any likelihood for an impoverished student to attend a charter school.  Schools 
tend to either have a very high or very low participation in free lunch programs, which 
indicates economic segregation (Bunka, 2011). Even though charter schools have resulted 
in greater choice, “accessibility and economic segregation remain an issue” (Bunka, 2011, p. 
294).  Charter schools in general have failed to address race and class issues, particularly 
those of integration and quality of education.  Scholars have associated these failures with a 
lack of intervention to increase diverse student populations and teacher representation in 
accordance with their students. 
 
4. Lack of Professional Development for Teachers 
 
Another element charter schools supporters offer is enhanced teacher professional 
development by way of fewer ‘restrictions.’  However, fewer restrictions are a euphemism 
for non-union schools.  About ninety percent of charter schools are non-union, which 
results in extremely high teacher attrition rates (Bankston, 2013; Miron 2007).  Non-union 
schools are associated with high teacher attrition rates because “workload and pay are 
often less variable among schools with union involvement” (Roch, 2015, p. 1383).  
Additionally charter schools tend to hire teachers from organizations like Teach for 
America, however these teachers are “recent college graduates with five weeks of teacher 
training.  Their inexperience makes them cheap labor” (Bankston, 2013, p. 21).  This hiring 
method threatens to de-professionalize the teaching industry.  Some scholars argue that 
the best way to improve schools is to provide incentives for teachers to participate as 
mentors, in peer reviews and decision-making processes, thus creating a path of 
professional development (Smith, 2015).  Teachers in charter schools run by management 
organizations have seen a decrease in autonomy compared to other types of charter 
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schools (Roch, 2015).  However, researchers have found that charter schools are just 
recently starting to respond to low teacher attrition rates with professional development 
opportunities (Roch, 2015).   Despite recent interventions to enhance professional 
development to avoid teacher attrition, because charter schools are anti-union, they 
typically do not provide teachers with professional development. 
There are four domains of criticism regarding charter schools: the lack of improvement 
in student achievement, the siphoning of public funds away from public education, the 
failure to address race and class equity, and the lack of professional development for 
teachers. The greatly varied student achievement among different charter schools and the 
findings on the similarities between successful traditional public schools and charter 
schools pose the question of whether we can expect consistent and sustainable 
improvements in student achievement in charter schools. Charter schools are negatively 
impacting the amount of public funds available for public education by using public funds 
to profit and weakening the financial stability of school districts.  They undermine the 
social and financial viability of the public education system (Massey, 1994).  This decreases 
access to public education.  Charter schools in general have failed to address race and class 
issues, particularly those of integration and quality of education.  These failures are 
associated with a lack of intervention to increase diverse student populations and 
prioritizing that teachers come from the same racialized group as their students. Charter 
schools are anti-union, which ensures a lack of teacher professional development. 
 
C. Kentucky’s Education System: National Rankings, Teachers’ Rights, and Standards 
 
Kentucky’s education system ranked nearly last in the nation in a number of areas 
for years and it was unfair in its prioritization of accountability standards over teachers’ 
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rights (A Citizen’s Guide to Kentucky Education, 2016; Ellis, 2011; Hunter, 1999; Kentucky 
Teachers Strike Expanding, 1970; White, 1998).  Kentucky’s education system was 
characterized by ranking nearly last in the nation in areas like adult literacy, the percentage 
of adults with a high school diploma, per pupil expenditure and pupil-teacher ratio (A 
Citizen’s Guide to Kentucky Education, 2016; Ellis, 2011; Hunter, 1999).  In fact, Kentucky’s 
only top ranking was regarding sending the most illiterate members to the draft in World 
War II (Ladd, 1999). Kentucky’s bottom ranking status bothered different interests 
particularly those concerned about workforce education (Ellis, 2011; Hunter, 1999; 
Walters, 2009).  This dissatisfaction gave rise to a lawsuit, which resulted in a court ruling 
the entire education system as unconstitutional.  Subsequently, the legislature enacted 
significant education reform that has been highly regarded by education experts (Ellis, 
2011; Superville, 2017; Ladd, 1999; Hunter, 1999). Given that is has moved from “the 
bottom of the barrel to the middle of the pack,” charter schools could pose a serious threat 
to public education (Representative Flood Interview, 2017).  Charter schools are associated 
with the weakening of teachers’ unions and education standards (McDermott, 2017; Davis, 
2013).  However, Kentucky’s teachers’ unions already have little influence and decisions 
around education standards are shifting towards the local school boards, as opposed to the 
state.  The conservative legislature is creating an environment where charters can thrive at 
the expense of an already weakened public education system. 
Not only was the system failing to enhance the education of its students, according 
to national rankings, but the system was also failing to protect teachers’ rights, particularly 
black teachers’ rights.  Teaching in Kentucky has not been treated as a highly respected 
profession in terms of salary and union strength.  Teacher organizations and unions, like 
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schools, were racially segregated in Kentucky. During times of federal integration efforts, 
Kentucky struggled to keep up, but by 1965, 95.2% of all school districts had integrated 
(Ellis, 2011). Although this percentage could be interpreted as an indication of successful 
integration efforts, integration occurred through the closure of black schools, not white 
schools.  Furthermore even though there were no more all black schools, all white schools 
still remained (Ellis, 2011). However, the state had not addressed how black teachers 
would fit into the integration plan. Thus black teachers were assigned to lower level 
positions and were paid less than their white counterparts even though “statewide, black 
teachers had, on average, higher levels of training” than white teachers (Ellis, 2011).  Even 
black teachers with tenure had to appear in court to sustain their positions and tenure 
status (Ellis, 2011).   
Black teachers lost even more control when black teacher associations like 
Kentucky Teachers Association merged into the majority white Kentucky Education 
Association (KEA), yet teachers were still not able to gain collective bargaining rights even 
after organizing a large statewide strike (Ellis, 2011).  KEA had been known for being led 
by administrators and the “old boys” in Frankfort (Ellis, 2011).  After teachers were 
organizing into other political action groups, the Louisville Federation of Teachers, an 
affiliate of the AFL-CIO, challenged KEA to address its elitist nature.  After some changes, 
teachers chose to make KEA their collective voice representation (Ellis, 2011). Thus KEA 
added a UniServ Program with eleven district offices across the state to serve teachers 
(Ellis, 2011). For one day in February of 1970, about 25,000 of Kentucky’s 32,000 teachers 
went on strike, which closed about 118 of the 193 school districts (Kentucky Teachers 
Strike Expanding, 1970).  After lawsuits ended the teacher strike and the education budget 
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increased by only $16 million, out of the available $18 million, teachers were not satisfied 
in being fully represented and felt they were forced to take part in the strike resulting in 
the widespread yet temporary closure of schools (Ellis, 2011). Administrators, legislators, 
and the public were wary of the new influence of public school teachers (Ellis, 2011). 
However, Governor Collins’ ideology did not follow suit with the aforementioned groups 
and he came out publicly in support of teachers. 
Even though Governor Collins was a public supporter of teachers and progress had 
been occurring before her term, it was too slow and ineffective in that it did not result in 
statewide collective teachers’ bargaining rights.  However, about a decade before Collins’ 
term, Governor Carroll’s term coincided with an advancing economy, and an increase in tax 
revenue, yet the statewide average teacher salary only rose from 46th in the nation to 38th 
in the nation.  Then, Governor Collins stated: “I tell audiences that whatever we do, 
teachers remain the key to better schools. Higher standards, tougher curriculum, more 
math and science—all of these are of limited value unless we also recognize that teachers 
make the difference,” (Ellis, 2011).  Even though teachers experienced some prioritization 
within education with the support of the governor and an increase in average teacher 
salary, teachers were not able to gain statewide collective bargaining rights (Ellis, 2011).  
As of 2010, only “23 percent of all Kentucky teachers are in districts with [collective 
bargaining agreements]” and Kentucky continues to lack statewide teacher bargaining 
rights (Sieler et al., 2010). 
While teacher’s collective bargaining rights, along with their salaries struggled to 
progress, testing and standards seemed to have more support in the legislature until 
recently.  Thus these new standards and forms of testing typically require increased 
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training and work for teachers, yet they were not seeing a proportionate rise in pay or 
rights.  The School Improvement Act of 1978 initiated the first statewide testing in an effort 
to move towards “academic excellence,” (Ellis, 2011). The State Department of Education 
“increased the number of high school credits needed for graduation from 18 to 20,” and in 
1979 all five year olds were to have access to kindergarten programs across the state (Ellis, 
2011).  Then in 1990, Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) was put 
into place as the state’s assessment system to ensure recently adopted standards of 
accountability were being met and measured (White, 1998).  According to Fair Test, the 
National Center for Fair and Open Testing, KIRIS was one of the best in the nation 
(Kentucky’s Assessment Program, 1997).  Fair Test acclaimed KIRIS for its “use of 
constructed-response and limited use of multiple choice, […] not making high-stakes 
decisions about individuals based on test scores, […] and providing extensive professional 
development and public information,” (Kentucky’s Assessment Program, 1997).  However 
Fair Test did note that it created a high-stakes approach for schools (Kentucky’s Assessment 
Program, 1997).  Then in 1998, the Commonwealth Accountability Testing System (CATS) 
was initiated and KIRIS was effectively terminated (A Citizen’s Guide to Kentucky Education, 
2016).  Unfortunately, CATS featured a restricted writing section and required that the 
results will be used in high stakes decisions about individual students; Fair Test had 
regarded KIRIS for not including these processes (Kentucky’s Assessment Program, 1997; 
White, 1998).  In the most recent legislative session of 2017, the legislature voted to 
essentially end CATS, reevaluate testing and standards, and will leave most of these 
decisions up to local school boards (Watkins, 2017a).  Before the 2017 legislative session, 
Kentucky was on a track of strengthening statewide standards.  However, possibly due to 
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the new conservative majority in the house, the senate and the governor’s office, Kentucky 
is experiencing a weakening of statewide standards and is redirecting these decisions to 
the local school boards (Watkins, 2017a). 
D. Kentucky’s Education Reform 
 
 
1. The Prichard Committee 
 
Education reform in Kentucky’s recent history resulted from the Prichard 
Committee’s work to generate public support for reform, the business community’s 
concerns for an educated workforce, and a court challenge and its subsequent ruling (Ladd, 
1999; Walters, 2009).  The advocated reform called for: “teacher education and 
certification, programs for young children, such as prenatal care and Head Start classes, 
further reductions in public school class sizes, and increased funding for schools and 
universities,” (Jester, 1985).   The Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence has been 
noted as largely responsible for the public support of education reform and its necessary 
increased taxes to support these reforms (Superville, 2017; Ladd, 1999; Walters, 2009; 
Ellis, 2011).  Since its inception in 1983, the Prichard Committee formed as a non-partisan 
and non-profit advocacy group and think tank for issues concerning public education.  The 
Prichard Committee was made up of “former governors, business leaders, education 
experts, and ordinary citizens” (Day, 2013).  The Prichard Committee focused on a 
campaign to propagate the idea that education reform would aid in bringing economic 
development to the state (Ladd, 1999; Walters, 2009; Day, 2013).  The campaign consisted 
of the distribution of materials and reports and the organization of televised town halls 
focused on education reform and tax increases in order to fund said reform (Ladd, 1999; 
Walters, 2009; Ellis, 2011; Hunter, 1999).  These tactics aided in giving the idea of 
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education reform widespread public support (Ladd, 1999; Walters, 2009; Ellis, 2011).  Not 
only did the idea have public support, there was no prominent group that was highly 
opposed to the idea of education reform.  The business community publicly supported it 
and its related tax increases because they were concerned about an uneducated workforce 
(Walters, 2009; Hunter, 1999).   
 
2. Need for an Educated Workforce 
 
As previously mentioned, Kentucky was first in the rankings for sending rejected 
draft members to war during World War II due to illiteracy (Ladd, 1999).  Thus since WWII, 
Kentucky leaders and the business community were worried the state was being left out of 
its share of economic growth due to its largely uneducated workforce (Ladd, 1999; Walters, 
2009; Hunter, 1999).  With Kentucky’s main fields of work being coal mining and 
agriculture at the time, the dominant perspective deemed that the workforce did not 
require high levels of education.  After Governor Collins and others were able to land a deal 
to bring a Toyota plant to Kentucky in 1986, some thought there was a pressing need for an 
educated workforce came with it (Ladd, 1999). 
 
3. Rose v. Council for Better Education and Kentucky Education Reform Act 
 
The Prichard Committee’s work and the business community’s support for 
education reform paved the way for one-third of Kentucky’s school districts to pressure the 
state to address its problems in public education.  Movement towards Kentucky’s education 
reform began in the courts with a lawsuit brought by 66 school districts accusing the 
legislature of not abiding by the state’s constitutional requirement to provide an adequate 
education to all students in Kentucky (Day, 2013). In 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
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ruled in Rose v. Council for Better Education that the state’s education system was 
unconstitutional and ordered the legislature to ‘re-create and re-establish’ it based on the 
Kentucky Constitution which mandates: “an efficient system of common schools 
throughout the State,” (Superville, 2017; Ladd, 1999; Hunter, 1999). In Rose v. Council, one-
third of the state’s school districts sued the state, which showed overwhelming 
dissatisfaction with the status quo (Ladd, 1999). This was the first time ever that a state 
supreme court ruled its entire education system as unconstitutional (Ladd, 1999). The 
Kentucky Supreme Court gave the legislature one year to design a new constitutional 
education system “in terms of programs available to students and student achievement 
results as opposed to per-pupil expenditures” (Ladd, 1999).  The Rose decision defined an 
‘efficient’ system as:  
one that was established and maintained by the General Assembly to be 
substantially uniform throughout the state, was free to all Kentucky 
children, and provided equal educational opportunity regardless of 
place of residence or economic conditions. An efficient system must also 
by sufficiently funded and free of waste, duplication, mismanagement, 
and political influence. (Day, 2013) 
 
This forced the legislature to work together and create the Kentucky Education Reform Act 
(KERA) in compliance with the seven goals for education and nine minimum standards that 
the court required (Ladd, 1999).   
The Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) took “Kentucky’s education system 
from one of the worst in the nation to the middle of the pack” (Representative Flood 
Interview, 2017).  KERA consisted of three primary elements: finance, curriculum and 
governance, which were funded with an increase in sales tax (Ladd, 1999; Walters, 2009). 
However, KERA ensured that no district could lose money and the distribution was more 
equitable, meaning the poorer districts gained a lot more than the wealthier districts (Ladd, 
#NowAreYouStartingToGetIt?: A Case Study of 'Stop Charters in KY’ Advocacy Campaign 
 
 22 
1999). After just four years of KERA’s implementation, the state’s “school finance inequities 
were cut almost in half” (Ladd, 1999).  
KERA succeeded in becoming law because it was perceived to be helpful to poor 
white people, not poor black people.  Because Kentucky’s population is overwhelmingly 
white and rural with the exception of Lexington and Louisville reform was seen as 
equalizing access to education for white people in Appalachia rather than black people in 
cities (Ladd, 1999; Walters, 2009). In Alabama, where reform was seen as improving 
education for impoverished black people, similar efforts to introduce fairness in funding 
floundered (Ladd, 1999).  There, racial minorities live in poorer districts thus equalizing 
reforms were perceived as disproportionately serving people of color more than white 
people (Ladd, 1999).   
Since KERA’s implementation, the financial equity piece is not the most disputed 
issue; conservatives especially have been opposed to its “standards-based reforms” in 
addition to the governance and curriculum components (Ladd, 1999).  Thus in the 
legislative session of 2017, the first year republicans have held the house in about two 
decades, issues of governance and curriculum have been altered with bills like Senate Bill 1 
that essentially repeals common core, reassess standards, and gives more power to local 
boards to “intervene in low performing schools and allows them to create their own 
teacher evaluation systems” (Watkins, 2017a).  Even though KERA is proven to have 
shifted Kentucky from the bottom to mid-level rankings in the nation in multiple areas 
concerning education, the legislature voted to roll back some standards introduced in 
KERA or since KERA (Hunter, 1999).  
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Charter schools are a part of the neoliberal marketization of education agenda that 
has taken hold in 44 states in the form of charter school authorization laws (Bunka, 2011; 
Davis, 2013).  Lower accountability standards and a siphoning of public funds away from 
traditional public schools are some of the threats that charter schools pose to traditional 
public schools (Harmer, 2017; Davis, 2013).  However, charter school supporters 
emphasize their ability to innovate due to their freedom from regulations (Davis, 2013; 
Levy, 2010).  Kentucky’s history of education reform has resulted in positive outcomes in 
the quality of education provided (Ellis, 2011; Ladd 1999).  However, state resources 
allocated to public education have decreased over the past decade (Pruitt, 2016).  This 
decline in funding has resulted in more public schools being labeled as failing (Ed Reform 
Playbook, 2017).  Additionally, Kentucky has always experienced weak teachers’ rights and 
has recently shifted from nationally recognized accountability standards to a rollback of 
said standards.  Consequently this has created a landscape in Kentucky where charters can 
thrive under weak teachers unions and the rollback of statewide standards and pose a real 
threat to public education in Kentucky.  Thus charter school legislation emerged in 
Kentucky and succeeded in passing into law. 
 
IV. Advocates: Save Our Schools Kentucky (SOSKY) 
 
Save Our Schools Kentucky (SOSKY) started the “Stop Charters in KY” advocacy 
campaign to block the passage of charter school legislation in Kentucky in the 2017 
legislative session.  SOSKY organized into a mobilized group during the 2016 election 
session with the specific intention of stopping charter schools from entering Kentucky.  
Even though the group mobilized just months before the 2017 legislative session started, 
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they were able to successfully map the political landscape, define their vision and mission, 
and engage their constituents.  However, the timing of their mobilization did prevent 
SOSKY from securing funding and formally organizing the leadership of the organization. 
 Save Our Schools Kentucky (SOSKY) is the main organized group of advocates that 
worked to stop charter schools in Kentucky. SOSKY is a recently formed “grassroots 
stakeholder advocacy group that seeks to raise awareness of impending legislation that 
could harm [Kentucky’s] public schools,” (SOSKY, 2017).  The advocates are primarily 
parents, teachers, and concerned citizens (Interviewee A, 2017; Interviewee B, 2017; 
Interviewee C, 2017).  Gay Adelmann, a parent, is the founder of SOSKY. Adelmann’s son 
went to a public high school in the Jefferson County Public School District in Louisville, 
Kentucky. After investigating into some issues within the school, she found some of the 
district’s activities and decisions were not making sense (Interviewee C, 2017). Adelmann 
began to trace the districts activities of harming her son’s public school toward the roots of 
the problem and found that the issues her district was experiencing were being 
experienced in other states around the US (Interviewee C, 2017).  
Adelmann’s investigation into the history of the dismantling of public schools 
conceptually aligns with one of Veneklausen and Miller’s “Mapping the Political Landscape” 
exercise (2011, p. 109).  Veneklausen and Miller say the exercise’s purpose is to: “identif[y] 
how a political system is organized and how different forces, people, organizations, and 
ideas shape the political space,” (2011, p. 109). Adelmann said: “the more research [she] 
did, the more [she] realized this is a national problem. [She] saw trends in other states and 
what was on the horizon for Kentucky,” (Interviewee C, 2017). Veneklausen and Miller’s 
exercise suggest discussing questions like: “Who has what kind of power?; Who has more 
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power?; Who has less power?; How is this imbalance maintained?; How can the imbalance 
be changed?” (Veneklausen and Miller, 2011, p. 109).  Adelmann saw that other states’ 
legislatures who had passed charter school legislation had lobbying groups, like Americans 
for Prosperity, registered in their states (Interviewee C, 2017).  As her research predicted, 
Americans for Prosperity registered to lobby in Kentucky for the first time (Interviewee C, 
2017). David and Charles Koch were the founders of the organization that is now 
Americans for Prosperity (Bennett, 2012).  Thus Adelmann knew she had to start SOSKY 
“to try and help wake other people up and align with those who were aware because [they] 
all felt disconnected and powerless. [They] wanted to find each other and be strategic and 
communicate with legislators about [they] wanted in [their] community,” (Interviewee C, 
2017).  Adelmann among other concerned parents, teachers, and stakeholders felt 
powerless and disconnected (Interviewee B, 2017). Veneklausen and Miller say isolation 
and lack of control are common responses for situations that make you feel powerless 
(Veneklausen and Miller, 2011). Thus Adelmann responded to those who felt similarly in 
order to curtail feelings of isolation and lack of control by organizing and taking control of 
their citizen’s rights by communicating with legislators about what they wanted 
(Interviewee C, 2011).  
 
A. Mission and Vision Statements 
 
SOSKY’s mission statement is focused on policy advocacy and is clearly defined as:  
 
We believe every child should have equitable access to a high-quality, 
publicly funded education. We believe publicly funded schools should be 
democratically controlled by and accountable to their local communities, 
and uphold the highest values of those communities. We believe publicly 
funded education must focus exclusively on our children’s growth and 
development, not on making profits or punishing communities. (Mission 
Statement, 2017) 
#NowAreYouStartingToGetIt?: A Case Study of 'Stop Charters in KY’ Advocacy Campaign 
 
 26 
 
Additionally the organization has four main priorities listed as:  
  
1) Encouraging legislators to restore funding of public schools to pre-
recession levels, and fully fund schools and programs so that all students 
can be successful; 2) preventing charter schools from taking funds away 
from already struggling public schools; 3) seeking authentic assessments 
that help children achieve their potential, while reducing the 
dependence and unhealthy obsession with high stakes tests; 4) stopping 
vouchers and scholarship tax credits from taking money from our public 
schools while shifting resources to private and religious schools. 
(Mission Statement, 2017) 
 
The mission statement aligns more with what Veneklausen and Miller deem to be a 
vision statement, which: “is how an organization would like the world to be in the future. 
Visions express ideals that may not be easily attainable in a given period of time,” (2011, p. 
97).  SOSKY’s mission includes the statement: “We believe every child should have 
equitable access to a high-quality, publicly funded education;” this seems to be an ideal that 
is not easily attainable in a short period of time, as the US has never seen equitable access 
to public education, let alone equitable access to high quality public education (Mission 
Statement, 2017).  The four main priorities align with what Veneklausen and Miller deem to 
be a mission, which: “guides policy decisions about alternative actions; prioritizes 
activities, demands the use of resources, channels collective action in one direction; and 
provides meaning and motivation for hard work,” (Veneklausen and Miller, 2011, p. 97).  
For example, one of the main priorities refers to “preventing charter schools from taking 
funds away from already struggling public schools,” which gives guidance towards policy 
decisions regarding any charter school system that is siphoning funds that otherwise 
would have gone towards public schools (Mission Statement, 2017; Veneklausen and Miller, 
2011). It is clear that this priority guided a policy decision on SOSKY’s part because HB520 
calls for the money to follow the child if he/she chooses to go to a charter school, thus 
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taking that money away from the public school (Harmer, 2017).  Because the bill clearly 
violated the priority statement, SOSKY decided to oppose the bill and organize around the 
opposition.  Veneklausen and Miller note that, “many organizations do not have a written 
vision or mission or if they do, the staff or members do not know it” (2011, p. 97).  Thus 
this is not to say SOSKY has their statements mislabeled, as different groups will have 
different definitions for these elements. However, it is to say that a group that formed in 
response to a sense or urgency still found it a valuable use of collective time and energy to 
outline these elements. This is crucial because “advocacy is a never-ending series of shifting 
situations involving difficult choices and unexpected outcomes,” and a clear vision and 
mission can help guide advocates and their potentially ever-changing strategies even in the 
midst of political chaos (Veneklausen and Miller, 2011, p. 97-8).   
The next step that Veneklausen and Miller suggest is to outline overall strategies 
that specifically align with the vision and mission of the organization. SOSKY has done this 
internally.  However, because Kentucky has such a retaliatory political climate right now, 
SOSKY and others are finding it more effective to not share these publicly.  For example, 
one advocate discussed that a “possibl[e] lawsuit is coming up. [SOSKY] isn’t sure if [they] 
are going to be involved or not yet” (Interviewee B, 2017).  The possible lawsuit would 
challenge the constitutionality of the law (Interviewee B, 2017).  SOSKY advocates seem 
hesitant to discuss the lawsuit to ensure remaining in the best position to take legal action, 
if deemed necessary.  However, Todd Ziebarth, from the National Alliance for Public 
Charter Schools said of opponents to HB 520 “I would be stunned if they didn’t challenge it 
[…] I just see it as a desperate attempt by those who oppose charter schools to do anything 
possible to prevent them from coming to the state and serving kids” (Watkins, 2017b).  
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Additionally, a democratic state senator, Ray Jones, “believes a constitutional challenge to 
Kentucky’s charter school law has a shot at success” and is willing to help in the lawsuit 
efforts (Watkins, 2017b).  
 
B. Timing, Funding, and Leadership 
 
SOSKY was formed during the election season of 2016 when the advocates that 
Adelmann had organized “got a sense” the Democrats would lose the house, resulting in 
Republican control of the state house, senate and governor’s office (Interviewee C, 2017). 
They knew they needed to prepare for the possibility of strong support for charter school 
legislation once the Republicans controlled the state legislature (Interviewee C, 2017).  
Some of the advocates have noted in retrospect that at this point “it was too little, too late 
by the time people started paying attention and getting involved;” another member of 
SOSKY said, “we [were] late to the game,”   (Interviewee C, 2017; Interviewee B, 2017).  
SOSKY has no source of funding, but the organization is applying for grants.  
Consequently all staff work on a volunteer basis.  The formal organization of SOSKY did not 
occur until after HB520 became law.  Other long-time established groups were concerned 
about the potential implications of HB 520, but focused on other social justice issues at risk 
like reproductive health and right to work laws.  During the campaign to stop charter 
schools in Kentucky, the organization in terms of leadership and decision making was more 
informal and came down to who was available at what times and whose strengths were 
needed to organize a call to action like a Twitter storm.  After HB520 became law, the 
organization filed for 501c4 status and formally organized the leadership.  Even though 
creating a formally organized structure “gives the effort stability and allows for longer-
term planning and division of the work to be done, it also requires sustained time, energy 
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and initiates a potential new set of challenges in terms of leadership and decision making” 
(Shultz, 2003).  SOSKY feels the time and energy required to create a formal structure is 
worth it, as the organization, in terms of charter schools, is taking on a new role in being 
the ‘watchdog’ to ensure as much accountability and transparency as possible.  
At the top of the leadership are the yearly elected executive officers in positions of: 
president, secretary, and treasurer.  Next in line are the vice presidential positions, which 
are also yearly elected positions: vice president of research and data, vice president of 
legislative response, vice president of media and communications, vice president of 
membership, and vice president of programs and outreach.  Additionally there are local 
chapter leaders across the state that report to the vice president of membership. In terms 
of decision-making, there is a board of directors that are elected every three years with 
succession permitted.  
 
C. Constituents 
 
Veneklausen and Miller defines primary constituents as “people who have a direct 
stake in an advocacy solution because they are directly affected by the problem and will 
benefit from the strategy,” and secondary constituents are “people who care deeply about 
the problem although they may not experience it personally, and are willing to make their 
voices heard,” (2011, p. 60).  The primary constituents, with the exception of students, are 
engaged as members and leaders.  The secondary constituents are involved in the coalition 
as well as members. SOSKY’s primary constituents are majority parents and teachers, and 
the secondary constituents are mostly concerned citizens and former teachers.  The 
chapters that exist across the state provide a space for primary and secondary constituents 
to get involved as members without living near the primary office in Louisville.  The lack of 
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student involvement is somewhat precarious as “a constituency approach transforms the 
role of ‘beneficiary’ to an active agent of change,”(Veneklausen and Miller, 2011, p. 61). The 
experiences of students “give them not only a strong motivation to get involved but also 
powerful stories and wisdom about potential solutions,” (Shultz, 2003, p. 99). As the most 
directly affected group, students should be involved but with children being minors, 
questions of their engagement exist around to what degree and in what capacity.  Shultz 
outlines a campaign to address violence towards girls where the teenage girls were 
provided a space to share their stories publicly and in front of legislators (2003). After the 
girls shared their stories, task forces were created and violence-prevention projects were 
started (Shultz, 2003). This example demonstrates a reasonable degree of involvement for 
a teenager in the campaign, which SOSKY could utilize.  
 The timing of SOSKY’s mobilization into an organization prevented the group from 
formalizing the leadership and securing adequate funding.  However, even with the 
pressure of timing, SOSKY was able to map the political landscape, define their vision and 
mission, and engage their constituents successfully. 
 
V. Policy: What is HB 520? 
 
A. What is the Problem with HB 520? 
 
The advocates of SOSKY understand the primary problem with HB520 to be that the 
charter school system it proposes will be a “significant threat to sustainable public 
education in Kentucky,” (Harmer, 2017).  More specifically, SOSKY advocates’ particular 
concerns with HB520 are:  
• the absence of the right of an authorizer to mandate goals and performance 
metrics;  
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• no cap on the number of charter schools;  
• the lack of minimum standards for the number of certified teachers in the 
classroom;  
• lack of ability for charter school teachers to collectively bargain with public 
school employees;  
• lack of local control of authorization and evaluation of charter schools;  
• limited accountability to the district and to its proposed performance 
metrics;  
• absence of how local, state, and federal funds and grants would be allocated 
to charter schools;  
• permitting for-profit charter schools;  
• and allowing renewal of underperforming charters (Harmer, 2017).   
 
The lack of control of authorization is a highly contentious issue, and one that was 
amended right before the bill was voted on to include the mayors of Lexington and 
Louisville to be authorizers in addition to local school boards.  The final piece of the 
authorization process is that of the appeals process.  Harmer highlighted “the bill’s 
administrative appeals process gives ultimate approval for every application to the state 
board” (2017).  The Kentucky state board of education is a group of members appointed by 
the governor, but the local school board and mayors are elected officials.  The way the 
appeals process is set up essentially gives ultimate authorizing rights to the state board, 
which features no elected members.  Thus this highlights the lack of accountability in the 
bill if ultimate authorizing rights are given to a group of people that the voters of Kentucky 
did not elect.  The governor could potentially select all members to be strong supporters of 
charter schools, thus the authorization of numerous applications without being held 
accountable to the people of Kentucky.  
The other piece of this contentious issue of authorization exists within the process 
and implications of adding the mayors of Lexington and Louisville as authorizers.  
Representative Scott noted that the final version of the bill did not reach house education 
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committee members until the evening before it would be voted on in committee at 8am the 
next morning (Interviewee D, 2017).  The late submission of the final bill was the first time 
mayors as authorizers had been included in the bill, as it had not been discussed at all, to 
Representative Scott’s knowledge (Interviewee D, 2017).  The adding of significant 
amendments without proportionate levels of discussion is absolutely a manifestation of a 
lack of transparency and accountability.  Additionally, even though mayors are elected 
officials, they are still single individuals.  Deeming a mayor as an authorizer of charter 
school application is giving significant power to a single individual who was not elected for 
their educational expertise.  The lack of control over authorization of charter school 
applications is a mechanism within the bill to take power away from elected local school 
boards.  This mechanism gives the power to governor appointed state board members who 
are not accountable to Kentucky people and to mayors who are not elected based on their 
educational knowledge and are single individuals with a lack of checks and balances. 
 
B. Education Reform Playbook 
 
The advocates of SOSKY consider the cause of the emergence of a charter school bill 
in Kentucky to be a part of larger conservative“education reform playbook,” (Ed Reform 
Playbook, 2017).  The “education reform playbook” is understood in a linear fashion: 1) cut 
funding in public schools, which results in removal of programs, less experienced teachers, 
and increased fees; 2) label schools as failing through “inauthentic assessments;” and 3) 
“bring in charters to ‘save the day!’” (Ed Reform Playbook, 2017; Interviewee C, 2017).  To 
put it simply, the advocates believe the cause to be the desire of some to make a profit off of 
children’s education. As one SOSKY member said: “the opportunists had already arrived 
and had been breaking public schools on purpose [by decreasing funding over the past 
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decade] to create a scenario such that charters would be a good alternative in people’s 
mind” (Interviewee C, 2017).  State representative Scott stated: “To witness this whole 
process showed me that outside influences [e.g. Koch Brothers and Company] have more 
influence than the voters across the state of Kentucky. This was really about the charter 
school industry making its move and putting its feet in Kentucky,” (Interviewee D, 2017).  
 
C. What Is the Policy Solution and Where Did It Come From? 
 
The policy solution that SOSKY was advocating for was to block the passage of 
HB520 and any bill that would allow charter schools into Kentucky. At first SOSKY was not 
staunchly opposed to charter schools in Kentucky because they were willing to collaborate 
with charter school supporters to pass a fair charter school bill that would not threaten the 
public education system (Interviewee C, 2017).  However after discussions with local 
groups holding similar views, SOSKY realized very few groups were willing to come out 
publicly against charters, as they “did not want targets on their back.  It is a retaliatory 
political climate right now,” (Interviewee C, 2017).  Unsicker suggests: “most often the best 
choice is the one that involves the least amount of confrontation or conflict to achieve the 
objective. […] [E]ven if unsuccessful, a non-confrontational first attempt may win allies and 
increase support for subsequent efforts that scale up the level of confrontation” (Unsicker, 
2003, p. 153).  SOSKY’s primary intention was to collaborate rather than start their efforts 
in confrontation.  However, SOSKY saw a need for clear opposition and decided to make 
their mission statement definitively against charter schools to ensure the opposition could 
not twist their message into somehow aligning with theirs (Interviewee C, 2017).  This 
clarity in their position resulted from the realization that no one else would take this stance 
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and it was the only way to protect the public education system from a harmful charter 
school bill.  
Although SOSKY was against blocking the passage of any charter school bill in 
Kentucky, Harmer states on the SOSKY page outlining their concerns with HB520: “At 
minimum, we believe charter school bills would have to be aligned fully with the 
Annenberg Recommendations for Accountability in Charter Schools,” (Harmer, 2017).  The 
Annenberg Institute for School Reform organized a group of grassroots organizations and 
leaders in 2012-13 to investigate the effect of the rapid development of charter schools on 
parents, students, and communities (Dingerson, 2014).  This working group resulted in 
setting seven standards they believe will combat the common problems they found with 
charter schools like: “uneven academic performance; practices that pushed or kept 
students out of charter schools; overly harsh discipline policies’ funding patterns that 
destabilized traditional schools; and a lack of representative governance, transparency, and 
adequate oversight, leading to potential conflicts of interest and instances of fraud and 
other problems” (Dingerson, 2014).  Given the lack of transparency and openness in the 
current political climate in Kentucky, these standards are not realistic.   
A large portion of the evidence that SOSKY used in order to create a policy position 
comes from reports of other states’ experiences with charter schools and the impact its had 
on their public school systems and the students.  SOSKY started a hash tag on social media 
entitled “Now are you starting to get it?” (Now Are You Starting to Get It?, 2017).  The hash 
tag is typically associated with a link to a news article or a link to another pro public school 
advocacy group page (nowareyoustartingtogetit, n.d.).  The underlying values and 
assumptions are essentially that charter schools can exist but not at the expense of public 
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schools.  This entails not allowing for-profit charter schools to be publicly funded and 
simultaneously privately operated, as this is a mechanism to significantly decrease 
transparency and accountability.  When privately owned companies manage public funds, 
taxpayers cannot hold these private companies as accountable as public entities. 
 
D. What Is the Opposition’s Policy Solution and Where Did It Come From? 
 
The opposition advocated for the passage of HB520 and is in support of charter 
school authorization in Kentucky.  The underlying values and assumptions of The Bluegrass 
Institute, the main opposition, are that charter schools in Kentucky will give “Kentucky 
children […] many of whom are disadvantaged and from lower-income homes […] the 
opportunity for the kind of charter-school education that will give them a chance to 
participate in the American dream of prosperity and a successful life,” (Waters, 2017b).  
Additionally the values of the organization as a whole are to “advance freedom and 
prosperity by promoting free-market capitalism, smaller government, and the defense of 
personal liberties,” (BIPPS, 2017).  Because their overall goal is to promote free-market 
capitalism and smaller government, these align with the goals of charter schools outlined in 
HB520 which allow the market to dictate our educational system with few regulations 
meaning less government involvement.  
The sources of evidence that The Bluegrass Institute cites are achievement gaps in 
Kentucky, which are determined by high stakes testing (Waters, 2017a; Innes, 2017).  The 
Bluegrass Institute argues that black students are struggling the most in Kentucky’s 
traditional public schools and charter schools will provide a space for students of color to 
succeed (Innes, 2017).  The Bluegrass Institute has determined that black students are 
struggling in Kentucky’s public schools based on the National Assessment of Educational 
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Progress’s web tool (Innes, 2017).  However, this tool has been criticized for its standard 
errors and its use of rank order statistics as inappropriate and not reflective of the 
complexities that exist within student achievement (Stoneberg, 2005).  
 
E. Political Targets 
 
Shultz says the primary target in an advocacy strategy is the individual who: “will 
make the actual decision to implement or not implement the change you want” (2003).  
Representative John (Bam) Carney is the primary target, as he is the head of the house 
education committee.  He has the power to call committee meetings and take votes from 
the other members and ultimately deem if a bill has passed through his committee or not.  
Shultz then says: “Once you know who you need to move, the next question is, what do they 
need to hear in order to be pushed in your direction?  Representative Carney is a unique 
primary target because he is also the sponsor of HB 520, making him what Shultz refers to 
as a “hard opponent” (2003).  A hard opponent is an official who “not only oppose[s] you 
but also are leading the charge against you” (Shultz, 2003).  Shultz goes on to say: “your 
goal with these legislators is to isolate them and to highlight the most extreme, most 
unsympathetic aspects of their opinions and actions” (2003).  Unfortunately, it is not 
advised to try and move a hard opponent, thus the most effective use of understanding how 
Carney fits in the strategy and political mapping is to simply understand his perception of 
the problem.  Representative Carney’s problems, as he stated in the house education 
committee meeting are that: “Kentucky’s public schools are “a one size that does not fit 
all;[…] Kentucky cannot remain behind the other 43 states that have passed charter school 
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legislation; […] current public schools are not serving low income students”  (Personal 
Observation, 2017).  
Similarly to Representative Carney’s target status, Governor Matt Bevin is also a 
hard opponent, as he was: “leading the charge against [us]” (Shultz, 2003).  Governor Bevin 
was also a primary target, but in a different part of the political process.  As governor, he 
has the power to veto a bill even after the house and senate approve it.  Consequently, he is 
a primary target, but not one worth spending time on trying to influence as he testified in 
support of HB 520 during House Education Committee meetings.  However, we can still 
note his understanding of the problem.  Governor Bevin stated that he is “disgusted” that 
his pro public school opponents don’t care about students (Personal Observation, 2017).  
Governor Bevin points to President Trump and Education Secretary DeVos and people we 
should look up to as leader on this issue (Personal Observation, 2017). Governor Bevin said 
it is not about money or power and that is he “begging to give every child an opportunity” 
(Personal Observation, 2017).  Governor Bevin repeatedly highlighted how our public 
schools are failing miserably and how charter schools are the answer (Personal 
Observation, 2017).    
 
F. Critique of SOSKY’s Policy Position on HB 520 
 
SOSKY’s advocated change was to block the passage of HB 520, and after a critique 
of their position, I believe it was the next step towards greater social justice.  However, I do 
not think the blocking of the bill would have led to a large step towards greater social 
justice.  If SOSKY advocated for an alternative policy solution in conjunction with working 
to block the passage of the bill, I would interpret this to be a more fruitful endeavor.  
Nevertheless, given the political context and the well-funded opposition, I do not think this 
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would have been a viable option.  Thus blocking the passage of HB 520 was the greatest 
advocacy effort to move closer towards greater social justice that was possible given the 
time and context.  I will elaborate further in the Evaluation section, but my initial critique of 
SOSKY’s position on HB 520 is that they were missing a potentially influential element.  If 
SOSKY had the resources to conduct informal research on the Districts of Innovation (DOI) 
and similar programs in other states, we could have advocated for the strengthening of 
(DOI) as an alternative to HB 520. 
 
VI. Politics: ‘Disgust’ with the Political Process 
 
The political process of HB 520 is as follows.  The bill has to go through the house 
education committee first and then is voted on by the entire House of Representatives. 
Then the bill goes to the senate education committee and is then voted on by the entire 
senate.  The house education committee chair was also the sponsor of the bill, 
Representative John Carney. Because of the Republican majority in the house, the senate 
and the governor’s office, it was clear that once the bill passed through the house education 
committee, it would pass through the rest of the legislative process.  Less than twenty-four 
hours elapsed from the point that legislators received the version of the bill to be voted on 
and the passage of the bill in the state house of representatives (Personal Observation, 
2017). 
The decision making process was not transparent and open. Although the house 
education committee was open to the public, the lack of transparency and openness 
manifested in more subtle ways.  Representative Carney publicly stated on Wednesday, 
two days before the bill was voted on in the house, that the legislature would not hear a 
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charter school bill that week. Representative Scott noted that the final version of the bill 
did not reach house education committee members until the evening before it would be 
voted on in the house education committee at 8am the next morning (Interviewee D, 2017).  
Representative Scott said: “I was extremely disappointed by the process […]; it is a 
deceptive way to run government” (Interviewee D, 2017).  Additionally Representative 
Scott noted she “didn’t think legislators [were] voting on behalf of their district, they were 
voting for some other interest” (Interviewee D, 2017).  Even in the house education 
committee, in which Representative Scott is a member of, Scott expressed concern about 
mayors being added as authorizers.  Representative Scott went on to say “something 
doesn’t smell right here” and she proceeded to vote no on the bill in committee (Personal 
Observation, 2017).  
Governor Matt Bevin stated that he is “disgusted” that his pro public school 
opponents, including teachers, don’t care about students and called them “liars” (Personal 
Observation, 2017).  Governor Bevin points to President Trump and Education Secretary 
Devos and people we should look up to as leaders on this issue (Personal Observation, 
2017).  Governor Bevin said it is not about money or power and that is he “begging to give 
every child an opportunity” (Personal Observation, 2017).  
Representative Mary Lou Marzian held Governor Bevin’s remarks in contempt. She 
expressed concern with Governor Bevin’s expression of disgust towards his opposition by 
stating: “political discourse is supposed to be cerebral so we shouldn’t be calling people 
liars,” (Personal Observation, 2017). Representative Marzian went on to say that she is 
disgusted with people who do not support teachers, and she called out Americans for 
Prosperity as being a Koch Brothers funded organization, showing that they have a 
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financial interest in charter schools (Personal Observation, 2017).  Furthermore 
Representative Marzian asked Bevin if he and his friends have a financial interest in charter 
schools, he denied her claim, and Marzian said she “want[ed] to see the tax returns because 
words are cheap,” (Personal Observation, 2017).  Bevin responded saying Representative 
Marzian has been on a “tirade” against him all session and he will not accept it” (Personal 
Observation, 2017).   
Not only was this exchange clearly emotionally charged, but it also reflects a lack of 
openness in the political process.  Governor Bevin’s tactics can be understood as a form of 
power over: “in politics, those who control resources and decision making have power over 
those without” (Veneklausen and Miller, 2011).  The level of power over that Governor 
Bevin was exemplifying was “hidden power”, which is understood as: “controlling who gets 
to the decision making table and what gets on the agenda. These dynamics exclude and 
devalue the concerns and representation of other less powerful groups […]. In some cases, 
leaders are vilified” (Veneklausen and Miller, 2011).  In this case, Governor Bevin devalued 
the concerns of advocates and representatives by lashing out against their character and 
vilified the leaders of the anti charter school campaign by saying they don’t care about 
students. If individuals are going to be personally attacked and labeled as liars or people 
who don’t care about students by the top elected official in the state, then it is 
understandable why some legislators and advocates might not feel comfortable fully 
expressing their concerns with a bill.   
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V. Strategy: #NowAreYouStartingToGetIt? 
 
Save Our Schools Kentucky’s strategy (SOSKY) was not successful in blocking the 
passage of charter school legislation in Kentucky.  The failure to provide adequate framing 
and coherent messaging contributed to the lack of success in keeping charter schools out of 
Kentucky.  However raising political awareness among their growing constituency and 
building rapport with legislators have positioned SOSKY auspiciously to move forward 
with more success in their future work regarding fighting for “equitable access to a high-
quality, publicly funded education” (SOSKY, 2017). 
 
A. Political Consciousness 
 
Jeff Uniscker writes, “[s]trategy consists of the planning and actions the advocates 
use to seek to (partially) solve problems by influencing policy institutions to accept their 
policy change goals” (2013, p. 41).  SOSKY’s strategy consisted of a majority of the efforts 
focused on the short-term goal of blocking the bill and the utilization of social media 
messaging to meet this goal.  SOSKY’s short-term goal was to stop charter school legislation 
from passing in Kentucky. The long-term goal, in regards to charter schools, is to take on 
the role of ‘watchdog’ and ensure accountability and transparency in the application 
process, the implementation of the school, and the funding.  One advocate described their 
interpretation of the ‘watchdog’ monitoring role as, “keeping an eye on when they finally 
open these charter schools, [which means] reporting the fraud, reporting the cherry 
picking of students, reporting all of these things that are inevitable and trying to protect the 
remaining public schools and the kids that are left there.” (Interviewee B, 2017).  The main 
objective in order to be effective monitors is to build a stronger constituency statewide and 
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the advocates are “starting to delegate that out right now. It’s going to be a lot [of work] 
once [charter schools] are open,” (Interviewee B, 2017; Interviewee C, 2017).   
Although there does not seem to be an explicit theory of change, I can infer from 
interviews and meetings that the basic logic of their strategy is: if SOSKY can build a 
stronger constituency across the state, particularly in more rural areas, then we will see a 
rise in political consciousness and thus provide a “basis for the sustained and informed 
citizen participation necessary to hold powerful interests accountable,” (Veneklausen and 
Miller, 2011, p. 62).  SOSKY seems to have a strong belief in the fact that because the 
opposition is well funded and SOSKY is not, their power comes from a coherent message 
from the majority of stakeholders (Interviewee B, 2017; Interviewee C, 2017).   
Veneklausen and Miller highlight Paolo Friere’s four stages of awareness as one way 
to understand how to build political consciousness (2011).  Based on Veneklausen and 
Miller’s concept and my intimate knowledge of the SOSKY’s long-term strategy, I suggest 
the organization considers launching a political consciousness community building 
campaign (2011).  By political consciousness community building campaign, I mean SOSKY 
should utilize its chapters across the state to spark conversations and activities that foster 
political consciousness, like Veneklausen and Miller’s “codes: opening discussion on 
difficult problems” (2011, p. 68).  Veneklausen and Miller suggest presenting a code to a 
community group, which “can be a drawing, role play, game, skit, song or story that 
presents a familiar problem in a concrete way” (2011, p. 68).  Then the facilitator or leader 
of the relative SOSKY chapter could help guide the conversation to ensure the participants 
discuss certain questions that Veneklausen and Miller suggest could increase political 
consciousness (2011).  The questions that help guide conversation are: “description of 
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what you see happening in [the code]; why is this happening?; does this happen in your 
community?; what problems does this lead to?; what are the root causes of these 
problems?; and what can we do about it?” (Veneklausen and Miller, 2011, p. 69).  As cited in 
Veneklausen and Miller, Paolo Freire’s approach says “as [participants] awareness 
deepens, these persons also begin to feel better about themselves. […t]heir observations 
and critical reasoning lead them to positive action” (2011, p. 64).  From interviews and 
personal observation, I can infer that SOSKY advocates believe if the public understood the 
roots of the issue and its implications, they would want to take action as well.  The timing of 
the building of political consciousness, occurring after the failure to block the passage of HB 
520, could prove to be prosperous, as the advocates now understand the nuances of the 
political context.  Unsicker says: “[o]ne of the most common failings is when a group or 
organization identifies a problem and then simply begins educating or mobilizing the 
community without a clear understanding about the institutions it must influence, how 
they work, and who else is involved in that process” (2013, p. 38).  Perhaps SOSKY’s 
messaging tactics through social media was the alternative to organizing these political 
consciousness discussions, as their base was not widespread enough and the considerable 
pressure of running out of legislative time. 
 
B. Messaging: #StopChartersInKY 
 
Veneklausen and Miller say in order to create an effective message, it is important 
to: 1) know your audience; 2) know your political environment and moment; 3) keep your 
message simple and brief; 4) use real life stories and quotes; 5) use precise powerful 
language and active verbs; 6) use clear facts and numbers creatively; 7) adapt the message 
to the medium; 8) allow your audience to reach their own conclusions; 9) encourage 
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audiences to take action; 10) present a possible solution” (2011, p. 232).  SOSKY created 
multiple messages and most, if not all, of the messaging occurred on social media.  As 
mentioned before, one of the messages took the form of a hash tag entitled “Now are you 
starting to get it?” (Now Are You Starting To Get It?, 2017).  This hash tag message was 
linked to stories of charter school fraud or other types of charter school failures in other 
states. Other frequently used hash tags were: “stop charters in KY; save KY schools; and No 
HB520,” (nowareyoustartingtogetit, n.d.). These messages generally align with the ten 
principles presented by Veneklausen and Miller mentioned above (2011).  The messages 
are particularly successful in adapting to their mediums’ and ‘encouraging audiences to 
take action.’ The use of hash tags was adapting to social media and the use of action words 
like ‘stop’ and ‘say no’ and the form of a question for ‘Now are you starting to get it?’ aid in 
encouraging audiences to take action.   
However, the messages do not align with presenting a solution, particularly the 
‘Now are you starting to get it?’ message.  The links to charter school fraud and failures 
were posted numerous times a day for weeks on end.  The audience could interpret the 
onslaught of failure after failure and fraud case after fraud case as debilitating.  The 
frequency and abrasive tone of the hash tag could have been met with audience responses 
of ‘yes, I get it, but now what?’  Unfortunately within this messaging, there was not a clear 
solution presented to the audience except to stop the passage of the bill.  Perhaps if there 
was an alternative solution along with the blocking of the bill, audiences could grasp the 
message with greater ease and willingness to take action.  Unsicker highlighted: “a 
reasonable tone activates a community approach and can-do attitude while an 
argumentative tone…makes audiences less likely to be open to new information and 
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solutions-based thinking” (2013, p. 200).  As mentioned before, I do not think it was viable 
to present a policy solution while blocking the passage of the bill.  Yet it was viable to use a 
less argumentative tone and a more reasonable tone like Unsicker suggested (2013). 
The message of “Stop charters in KY” was made into buttons that advocates would 
wear in the Capitol and simply around town. The message text was superimposed onto a 
stop sign on the buttons.  This stop sign image was also used in a lot of advocates profile 
pictures (Image 1, 2017).  Veneklausen and Miller say: “a good poster will captivate, 
energize, provoke and educate” (2011, p. 253).  The stop sign button is successful in 
captivating and energizing with its bright colors and easy to read text.  It is not as 
successful in provoking or educating, as it does not provoke a specific action and it does not 
educate the audience as to what a charter is or what ‘SOS_KY’ stands for. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Image 1 shows the image used in advocates profile pictures and on buttons) 
 
 
SOSKY utilized a ‘Twitter storm’ to educate the public and to influence target 
institutions.  On SOSKY’s social media platforms of Facebook and Twitter, the advocates 
created an event to engage their constituency and take part in a ‘Twitter storm.’ A Twitter 
storm is when a large group of people tweet at a targeted group of individuals with 
consistent messaging.  In this case, SOSKY created a page on their website entitled “Tweet 
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Your Legislators,” (Tweet Your Legislators, 2017).  On the page, a constituent had the choice 
of seven hyperlinked messages: “Hijacked HB520; Sell Outs Will Be Voted Out; Charter 
Schools Are Wrong For Kentucky; Bad For Rural Districts; Wrong Bill, Wrong Time; 
Charters Will Hurt Public Schools; Tax Payers Can’t Afford HB520” (Tweet Your Legislators, 
2017).  Not only were there seven overarching messages, but there were also ten or so 
version of each overarching message.  These hyperlinked messages directed the 
constituent to one more webpage that gives a brief description of the thinking behind the 
message and then featured ten or so tweets already written for the constituent. The next 
step for the constituent was to click on the tweet that suited them best, based on who they 
wanted to target, and it would bring them to their personal Twitter page and have the 
tweet written and ready to be published.  
My interpretation of the use of different messages was that there was no framing 
occurring to ensure relevancy to particular audiences.  The Twitter storm was used to 
influence targets and to educate the public.  Yet there was an excessive amount of 
messages, which could inhibit projecting a coherent and consistent message for any 
audience, let alone more than one at a time.  However, advocacy experts do not agree with 
this method.  Veneklausen and Miller say: “frames are the boundaries that highlight specific 
parts of an issue, place others in the background, and leave out some entirely.  The frame 
influences how an audience thinks about an issue, including who is responsible for the 
cause and its solution” (2011, p. 235).  For example, the message of ‘Wrong Bill, Wrong 
Time’ might make sense to a legislator who understands the 2017 legislative session was 
notorious for passing conservative bills on social issues like reproductive health, workers 
rights, and now education through means that were not transparent.  The legislator might 
#NowAreYouStartingToGetIt?: A Case Study of 'Stop Charters in KY’ Advocacy Campaign 
 
 47 
understand more than an ordinary Twitter user that this bill was pushed through at the 
last minute at the very end of the session, as if it were being rushed through.  On the other 
hand, the message of ‘Bad For Rural Districts’ would clearly only be relevant to those in 
rural districts and not those in more urban districts.   
Other than social media messaging and Twitter storms, SOSKY held a rally at the 
Capitol with a wide range of speakers and a post-card writing activity to provide an 
opportunity for concerned community members to easily write to their legislators.  
However the rally was not well attended, as fewer than twenty people came to the event, 
which decreased its efficacy.  
SOSKY did not do much to engage the media. The media reached out to SOSKY 
leaders for statements and interviews, but we rarely would find that these would make it 
into published articles. Thus it seemed more effective to use social media to ensure the 
messaging was fairly represented.   
 
 
C. Collaborating With Legislators 
 
In order to influence target institutions, SOSKY engaged in a substantial amount of 
lobbying, some collaboration and some protest.  SOSKY advocates met with every member 
of the house education committee and almost every member of the senate education 
committee (Interviewee A, 2017; Interviewee C, 2017). One SOSKY leader was able to 
collaborate, in a sense, with their legislator, Republican Representative Julie Raque Adams.  
SOSKY was able to hold multiple meetings with Representative Adams, as she admitted she 
was not an expert on the bill or charter schools in general.  Representative Adams was 
receptive to SOSKY’s discussions and she noted that they inspired her to do more research 
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on her own as well (Interviewee C, 2017).  SOSKY advocates perceived Representative 
Adams to be a potential “fence sitter”, even though she was a Republican (Shultz, 2003, p. 
168).  Shultz defines a fence sitter as: “the lawmakers who could end up voting either way” 
(2003, p. 168).  Unfortunately she ended up voting for the bill, and in retrospect I would 
label her as a “soft opponent” which Shutlz defines as: “lawmakers who will vote against 
you no matter what you do, but whose vehemence you can diminish” (2003, p. 169).  I see 
her as a soft opponent now because she is still a relatively new legislator, and new 
legislators in the majority party rarely vote against party lines. 
One SOSKY member is Republican, possibly the only one so far, and they were able 
to lobby legislators from a different perspective.  The republican SOSKY advocate stated:  
 
I’ve been in contact with my legislators for a long time. I was advocating 
for better testing and accountability systems. I was involved in opt-out 
and other pro public education movements. I’ve changed my focus a 
little by focusing on charter schools and I emailed my legislators. I have 
a really good relationship with [Representative Ernie Harris] now. I 
engaged him on this law. He is now writing an opt-out [for state testing] 
law,” (Interviewee B, 2017) 
 
Unsicker states: “the success of collaboration and often lobbying depend on success in 
building relationships between the advocates and decision makers” (2013, p. 42).  Although 
the advocates’ lobbying efforts were not successful in blocking the passage of HB 520, the 
advocates were successful in building relationships with decision makers.  These 
relationships can help to carry out long-term goals and future policy campaigns, as it seems 
to already be aiding the aforementioned advocate in promoting opt-out of state testing 
legislation (Interviewee B, 2017).  
 Overall, SOSKY’s strategy was ineffective in terms of blocking the passage of charter 
school legislation in Kentucky.  However, particular elements of their strategy placed the 
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organization in an auspicious position for their future work.  First, SOSKY was successful in 
building a stronger constituency base and facilitating their political consciousness through 
methods like Twitter storms.  The fact that hundreds of Twitter users participated in the 
Twitter storm and engaged their “critical awareness” of the issue means political 
awareness was raised and action was taken upon it (Veneklausen & Miller, 2011, p. 64).  
However, the Twitter storm suffered in its immediate purpose, as it featured too many 
different messages and was not framed properly thus decreasing its impact.  Second, 
SOSKY members were able to establish rapport with legislators.  This rapport will serve in 
providing SOSKY with legislative allies in their transition to becoming the ‘watchdogs’ of 
charter schools in Kentucky.  Additionally, this rapport is currently serving one member, as 
she is collaborating with Representative Harris to write a bill for next session on opt-out 
for state testing (Interviewee B, 2017).  Even though the campaign was not effective in 
preventing charter school legislation from passing in Kentucky, particular aspects of the 
strategy positioned SOSKY favorably to continue fighting for “equitable access to a high-
quality, publicly funded education” (SOSKY, 2017).  
 
VIII. Evaluation 
 
As I have included my evaluation of certain elements of the campaign throughout 
this paper, I will use this section to highlight broad achievements and limitations.  As 
mentioned previously, HB 520 has been signed into law and has now taken effect.  In terms 
of SOSKY’s short-term goal to block the passage of the bill, this effort was unsuccessful.  
SOSKY’s late mobilization and the utilization of untargeted messaging were limitations of 
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the campaign.  However SOSKY was able to succeed in building a strong constituency base 
via social media and establish rapport with state legislators.   
SOSKY’s campaign was limited by mobilizing into an organization late in the 2016 
election season.  The timing of their mobilization prevented them from being able to 
establish adequate funding and from formally organizing the leadership and roles within 
the organization.  A lack of funding and a lack of formal roles presented obstacles in getting 
physical bodies to rally and lobby with legislators.  Unfortunately because the organizing 
began so late, there was little time to devote to fundraising and identifying formal roles.  
When the advocates were asked to name the biggest obstacles they faced in realizing their 
goals around this bill, one noted that: “no funding was the biggest [obstacle].  Everything 
[she] did, came out of [her] pocket and was done on [her] time. [She is] self-employed, so 
those were hours that [she] wasn’t billing her client,” (Interviewee C, 2017).  Another 
advocate stated: “The charter side is fully funded. The lobbyists get paid to be in Frankfort 
everyday. We are a grassroots movement that doesn’t get paid” (Interviewee B, 2017).  
Shultz says: “Fund-raising is a piece of the work that has to put on the table early. […] 
Activist campaigns use a wide assortment of methods to raise funds […]: membership dues, 
events, door-to-door canvassing, direct mail and phone solicitation, major donors, 
foundation grants, organizational contributions, sale of publication and materials, and in-
kind support” (2003, p. 107-110).  As mentioned before, the advocates organized late in 
2016 election season and had no time to put fundraising ‘on the table early,’ as Shultz 
suggests (2003).  Unfortunately this hindered the amount of time advocates were able to 
spend on the campaign.  Even in the face of great injustice, people still need to support their 
families and advocacy is time consuming.  Although informal roles were established for 
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some, the decision of who would execute a particular tactic came down to who was 
available or who was located closest to the state capitol rather than who is the strongest in 
communicating with legislators, for example.  One advocate noted: “[SOSKY] had a number 
of people who brought considerable talent with them. [Now it is] just continuing to find 
them and put them where there strengths are and not burning out” (Interviewee C, 2017).  
Unsicker suggests: “small organizations, often with limited human and financial resources, 
must often pay significant attention to using others’ resources” (2013, p. 84).  One advocate 
explained that: “[they] needed help and approached KEA [Kentucky Education Association], 
but they ignored us,” (Interviewee B, 2017).  SOSKY is a small organization with limited 
human and financial resources, however, reaching out to other local groups in order to use 
their resources proved unsuccessful thus the group was left to use whatever resources they 
could conjure up among themselves. 
 Another limitation of the campaign was the lack of framing and a clear focus in the 
messaging.  As mentioned in the strategy section, the Twitter storm had some success in 
activating SOSKY’s constituency and facilitating communication with their legislators.  Each 
of the seven or so main messages had ten different variations of the message.  Although 
some messages featured particular legislators names and Twitter handles, the message 
itself remained unchanged from others.  The Twitter storm could have been more effective 
if the messages were framed for the legislators separately from messages intended for the 
public in Kentucky.  Additionally, there were far too many options for participants to 
choose from, which resulted in a lack of clarity in the focus.   
However there were successes in terms of the advocacy process.  The advocates and 
I view the mobilization and increase in awareness among the public as one of the successes 
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of the campaign. One advocate stated: “We are mobilizing and educating people. I 
remember when [the Facebook page] had 100 likes, now it is close to 1000, and that 
happened quickly,” (Interviewee B, 2017).  Because of the limited amount of time the 
advocates had, their use of social media aided in communicating with constituents 
statewide and on their own time.  It was through platforms like Facebook and Twitter that 
SOSKY was able to establish chapter leaders across the state in a few short months.  
Chapter leaders were able to engage people in their communities, particularly those whose 
circumstances prevented them from being able to attend rallies and lobby at the capitol.  
This type of engagement is key in being able to move forward as watchdogs of the charter 
school authorization process in the future.   
Lastly, the recognition of the group among legislators is a success that will aid in 
leading to campaign successes in the future.  As mentioned before, SOSKY is a new 
organization, but this has not hindered their ability to establish rapport with state 
legislators.  One advocate said:  
 
We were a non-partisan group – no union, no party.  We are just 
parents and teachers that want schools fully and equitably funded. We 
are now a known group to people in Frankfort.  We know what we are 
talking about, which impresses people. [Representative Adams] was 
asking us for information […] The connections that we’ve made now 
know that we will hold [them] accountable (Interviewee B, 2017).  
 
Watson’s “Impact analysis for social justice advocacy” says that “new channels for 
participation; position, credibility, and power of campaign participants strengthened; 
ability to articulate rights and formulate proposals to assert these rights; and increased 
awareness of members and other sectors of civil society and public about issues at stake” 
are indicators of success (as cited in Unsicker, 2013, p. 242-3).  With SOSKY as a known 
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group in Frankfort that is respected and viewed as a group of educated citizens exercising 
their rights through their ability to articulate what they want, I think the campaign meets 
all of these indicators of success.  Even though the bill passed, and Kentucky will have 
charter schools in the future, the campaign heeded some successes, like building credibility 
and relationships that will aid in future goals around protecting and improving public 
education. 
 
VIIII. Lessons Learned 
 
 HB 520 was passed into law and the role of SOSKY regarding charter schools has 
shifted into occupying the role of watchdogs.  By watchdogs I mean paying extremely close 
attention to charter school applications and the authorization process and holding 
everyone involved accountable.  Additionally, as watchdogs, SOSKY intends to keep the 
public informed on the status of the application process and eventually the establishment 
and maintenance of the schools themselves.  SOSKY will be able to occupy the role of 
watchdogs effectively with the help of their strong constituency base and their 
communication methods via social media.   
The overall use of social media was extremely effective in bringing people to the 
conversation and keeping them engaged throughout the arduous legislative session.  This 
lesson from the ‘Stop Charters in KY’ campaign will prove to serve the organization in 
immense ways in bringing about the shift towards the watchdog role.  For example, if 
charter schools are only being authorized by the state board, a group of governor-
appointed members, SOSKY already has a captive audience ready to take action and spread 
the message that schools are not being approved by locally elected boards.  One expert 
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suggests to keep an engaged social media constituency, the organization needs: “an 
empowered community manager […] behind the computer on a daily basis responding to 
comments and tweets with enough editorial freedom to develop an authentic voice and 
capitalize on real-time happenings in the media” (Connery, 2013).  This has always been 
the case of SOSKY’s social media presence, perhaps indicating why the use of social media 
has been so effective for building a constituency for the organization.  SOSKY’s posts are 
commenting on ‘real-time happenings in the media’ and is posting and responding daily.  
The constant upkeep on the social media pages to keep constituents engaged on the issue 
will be paramount in occupying the watchdog role. 
The final lesson learned from the ‘Stop Charters in KY’ campaign regards the lack of 
formal organization and leadership roles during the campaign.  Since the bill has passed 
and the 2016 legislative session is over, SOSKY has had time to formally organize.  
However, during the campaign roles were not clearly defined thus decisions were made 
based who had more time or who was more conveniently located to an event or a meeting 
with a legislator.  Shultz suggests that groups “adopt only the level of structure they need to 
get the work done, and no more” (2003, p. 110).  I am not suggesting that SOSKY should 
have established a formal board of directors and bylaws, but clearly defining roles would 
have been extremely helpful and more proportionate to the level of work needed.  Some of 
the advocates were feeling burnt out and exhausted from having to execute almost every 
plan and possibly filling a role that was not suited to their strengths because roles were not 
clearly defined.  The lessons learned from SOSKY’s utilization of social media will 
effectively serve future efforts as watchdogs of all the processes involved with charter 
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school legislation.  Finally, the work of SOSKY will improve immensely now that the group 
is formally organized and roles are clearly defined.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Conservative activists have been promoting neoliberal reforms for the US education 
system for several decades.  The marketization of education is the latest trend in this 
neoliberal education agenda, and it finally took hold in Kentucky in the form of a new law 
authorizing charter schools (Bunka, 2011; Davis, 2013).  Charter schools come with lower 
levels of public accountability, and they siphon public funds away from traditional public 
schools (Harmer, 2017; Davis, 2013). Charter school supporters highlight their ability to 
innovate with the removal of regulation, a hallmark of neoliberalism (Davis, 2013; Levy, 
2010).  Kentucky has a history of education reform policies aimed at equity that have 
resulted in an improvement in the quality of public education (Ellis, 2011; Ladd, 1999).  
However, public education has seen a decline in the allocation of state resources over the 
past decade (Pruitt, 2016).  This steady decline in funding hurt public education, allowing 
conservative activists to claim public schools are ineffective (Ed Reform Playbook, 2017).  
Thus charter school advocates succeeded in passing a law to allow the first charter schools 
in the state. 
SOSKY’s ‘Stop Charters in KY’ advocacy campaign was successful in building a strong 
constituency base and building rapport within the legislature but failed to block the 
passage of charter school legislation due to the timing of the mobilization, the political 
timing, and the timing of the legislative action on the bill.  SOSKY’s mobilized into an 
organization late in the 2016 election season, which prevented the group from formalizing 
#NowAreYouStartingToGetIt?: A Case Study of 'Stop Charters in KY’ Advocacy Campaign 
 
 56 
the leadership and securing adequate funding.  However, even with the pressure of timing, 
SOSKY was able to map the political landscape, define their vision and mission, and engage 
their constituents successfully.  The advocates saw the primary problem with HB520 to be 
that the charter school system it proposes will be a “significant threat to sustainable public 
education in Kentucky,” (Harmer, 2017).  SOSKY advocates understood HB 520 as a threat 
to public education because its authorization process takes power away from local boards 
and gives it to state appointed officials, and it permits a no cap limit on charter schools in 
the state, including for-profit charter schools.  Then the decision making process was not 
particularly transparent and open. Additionally, the campaign suffered in a time when 
conservatives held the majority in the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the 
governor’s office.  Furthermore SOSKY’s overall strategy was ineffective in terms of 
blocking the passage of charter school legislation in Kentucky.  However, SOSKY members 
were able to establish rapport with legislators and increase the political consciousness of 
their constituents. Thus particular elements of their strategy placed the organization in an 
auspicious position for their future work.  My analysis shows that because SOSKY 
mobilized too late in order to set up adequate fundraising strategies, the conservatives 
finally had control of all bodies in the state legislature, and the bill was pushed through at 
the end of the session giving Kentuckians very little time to become familiar with its 
contents, the Stop Charters in KY campaign failed this legislative session. However, the 
strong constituency base and rapport with the legislature will aid in SOSKY’s future work 
as watchdogs of the implementation of HB 520 in Kentucky.   
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